The effect of collusion games on the profit of primary networks and secondary heterogeneous cognitive radio networks with femtocells

Yousef N. Shnaiwer*, Salam A. Zummo

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of the different pricing games played by the primary user (PU) operators on the profit of both the PU networks and the cognitive base station (CBS). We show that the price achieved by the PU operators in the collusion game (called the Pareto point) is the maximum price that can be achieved in the competitive game when the substitutability parameter is higher than zero. However, for negative values of the substitutability parameter, the Pareto point represents the minimum price that can be offered by the PU operators. Moreover, the effect of the collusion game on the profit of the CBS has also been investigated, and the simulations show that the worst case for the CBS in terms of profit is not associated with the highest price that can be offered by the PU networks.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2014 9th International Conference on Cognitive Radio Oriented Wireless Networks and Communications, CROWNCOM 2014
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages383-388
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9781631900037
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 2014 9th International Conference on Cognitive Radio Oriented Wireless Networks and Communications, CROWNCOM 2014

Keywords

  • Femtocell cognitive radio
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Pareto point
  • Stackelberg games
  • collusion games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications

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