On the impact of corruption on managers' and controllers' behavior

Slim Belhaiza; Salwa Charrad; Rym M'Hallah

doi:10.1051/ro/2021191

On the impact of corruption on managers' and controllers' behavior

Slim Belhaiza^*
, Salwa Charrad
, Rym M'Hallah

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, we study the impact of corruption in the context of a game involving a manager and a controller. We propose a model where the controller initiates the bribe demand from the manager. We identify the structure of three potential subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and show their uniqueness. Next, we analyze the influence of the corruption parameters (bribery amount, reciprocity bonus and reputation gain) and the manager's and the controller's bonuses/penalties on the equilibria. Finally, we explain how the manager and the controller may increase, decrease or maintain their performance, when the bribery amount, the reciprocity bonus or the reputation gain index increase.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	165-181
Number of pages	17
Journal	RAIRO - Operations Research
Volume	56
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2021191
State	Published - 1 Jan 2022

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 The authors. Published by EDP Sciences, ROADEF, SMAI.

Keywords

Corruption game
Game theory
Manager-Controller conflict
Nash equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Theoretical Computer Science
Computer Science Applications
Management Science and Operations Research

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1051/ro/2021191

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title = "On the impact of corruption on managers' and controllers' behavior",

abstract = "In this paper, we study the impact of corruption in the context of a game involving a manager and a controller. We propose a model where the controller initiates the bribe demand from the manager. We identify the structure of three potential subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and show their uniqueness. Next, we analyze the influence of the corruption parameters (bribery amount, reciprocity bonus and reputation gain) and the manager's and the controller's bonuses/penalties on the equilibria. Finally, we explain how the manager and the controller may increase, decrease or maintain their performance, when the bribery amount, the reciprocity bonus or the reputation gain index increase.",

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AU - Charrad, Salwa

AU - M'Hallah, Rym

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N2 - In this paper, we study the impact of corruption in the context of a game involving a manager and a controller. We propose a model where the controller initiates the bribe demand from the manager. We identify the structure of three potential subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and show their uniqueness. Next, we analyze the influence of the corruption parameters (bribery amount, reciprocity bonus and reputation gain) and the manager's and the controller's bonuses/penalties on the equilibria. Finally, we explain how the manager and the controller may increase, decrease or maintain their performance, when the bribery amount, the reciprocity bonus or the reputation gain index increase.

AB - In this paper, we study the impact of corruption in the context of a game involving a manager and a controller. We propose a model where the controller initiates the bribe demand from the manager. We identify the structure of three potential subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and show their uniqueness. Next, we analyze the influence of the corruption parameters (bribery amount, reciprocity bonus and reputation gain) and the manager's and the controller's bonuses/penalties on the equilibria. Finally, we explain how the manager and the controller may increase, decrease or maintain their performance, when the bribery amount, the reciprocity bonus or the reputation gain index increase.

KW - Corruption game

KW - Game theory

KW - Manager-Controller conflict

KW - Nash equilibrium

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85124684690

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DO - 10.1051/ro/2021191

M3 - Article

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SN - 0399-0559

VL - 56

SP - 165

EP - 181

JO - RAIRO - Operations Research

JF - RAIRO - Operations Research

IS - 1

ER -

On the impact of corruption on managers' and controllers' behavior

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

UN SDGs

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