Abstract
Given the vital role of independent directors in determination of executives' compensation, we explore how independent directors view the CEO pay disparity. Using the data of all companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges for the period 2005 to 2015, we find that the proportion of independent directors on the board is negatively associated with the extent to which executives' pay is dispersed. This finding suggests that independent directors view the dispersion of the CEO's and other executive directors' pay from the managerial power theory perspective rather than from the tournament theory.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 95-103 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | Pakistan Journal of Commerce and Social Science |
| Volume | 13 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| State | Published - 2019 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2017 Johar Education Society, Pakistan.
Keywords
- And state owned firms
- CEO pay disparity
- CEO tenure
- China
- Independent directors
- Managerial power
- Tournament incentives
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
