Full-duplex cyber-weapon with massive arrays

In order to enhance secrecy performance of protecting scenarios, understanding the illegitimate side is crucial. In this paper, from the perspective of the illegitimate side, the security attack from a full-duplex cyber-weapon equipped with massive antenna arrays is considered. To evaluate the behavior of the proposed cyber-weapon, we develop a closed-form, a tight approximation, and asymptotic expressions of the achievable ergodic secrecy rate with taking into consideration imperfect channel estimation at the cyber-weapon. The results show that even under some disadvantage conditions, i.e., imperfect channel estimation and self-interference, the full-duplex massive array cyber-weapon can disable traditional physical layer protecting schemes, i.e., increasing the transmit power and the number of antennas at the legitimate transmitter. In addition, when a transmit power optimization scheme for maximizing the difference between the eavesdropping rate and the legitimate rate is applied at the full-duplex cyber-weapon, the malicious attack is even more dangerous. The results also reveal that when the legitimate side faces an advance adversary, it is essential to prevent important information in the training phases exposing to the illegitimate side.