Firewall policy reconnaissance: Techniques and analysis

In the past decade, scanning has been widely used as a reconnaissance technique to gather critical network information to launch a follow up attack. To combat, numerous intrusion detectors have been proposed. However, scanning methodologies have shifted to the next-generation paradigm to be evasive. The next-generation reconnaissance techniques are intelligent and stealthy. These techniques use a low volume packet sequence and intelligent calculation for the victim selection to be more evasive. Previously, we proposed models for firewall policy reconnaissance that are used to set bound for learning accuracy as well as to put minimum requirements on the number of probes. We presented techniques for reconstructing the firewall policy by intelligently choosing the probing packets based on the responses of previous probes. In this paper, we show the statistical analysis of these techniques and discuss their evasiveness along with the improvement. First, we present the previously proposed two techniques followed by the statistical analysis and their evasiveness to current detectors. Based on the statistical analysis, we show that these techniques still exhibit a pattern and thus can be detected. We then develop a hybrid approach to maximize the benefit by combining the two heuristics.