Cooperation with leaders in social dilemmas: On the effects of procedural fairness and outcome favorability in structural cooperation

The present research examined the effectiveness of leadership in influencing cooperation in social dilemmas by focusing on the procedural fairness and favorability of leaders' outcome decisions. We predicted that leader's influence on cooperation would be determined by the fairness of the procedures used, but only so when received outcomes were unfavorable. Across two experimental studies, support for this hypothesis was found. Both in Study 1 (using accuracy as a manipulation of procedural fairness) and Study 2 (using voice as a manipulation of procedural fairness), it was found that procedural fairness influenced contributions in a public good dilemma only if outcomes were unfavorable (i.e., participants received less than an equal share), whereas procedural fairness did not influence level of contributions when outcomes were favorable (i.e., participants received more than an equal share).