Abstract
This study examines whether the presence of an ineffective audit committee at family and non-family firms can influence the firms’ non-audit service purchases from the incumbent auditor. Using a sample of 1736 observations of UK-listed companies from 2005 to 2013, we find a significant positive association between ineffective audit committees and non-audit service fees. This association is more pronounced for family than for non-family firms, suggesting that in the UK, family firms with ineffective audit committees tend to buy more non-audit services from their incumbent auditors than non-family firms. The results also show that family firms with ineffective audit committees pay higher non-audit service fees when their family members own shares or hold board positions, indicating that both types of involvement lead to larger non-audit service expenditures.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 100356 |
| Journal | Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation |
| Volume | 41 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Dec 2020 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2020 Elsevier Inc.
Keywords
- Agency problem
- Audit committee
- Auditor independence
- Corporate governance
- Family firms
- Non-audit service fees
- UK
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting
- Finance