Audit committee effectiveness and non-audit service fees: Evidence from UK family firms

Jihad Al-Okaily*, Nourhene BenYoussef

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

This study examines whether the presence of an ineffective audit committee at family and non-family firms can influence the firms’ non-audit service purchases from the incumbent auditor. Using a sample of 1736 observations of UK-listed companies from 2005 to 2013, we find a significant positive association between ineffective audit committees and non-audit service fees. This association is more pronounced for family than for non-family firms, suggesting that in the UK, family firms with ineffective audit committees tend to buy more non-audit services from their incumbent auditors than non-family firms. The results also show that family firms with ineffective audit committees pay higher non-audit service fees when their family members own shares or hold board positions, indicating that both types of involvement lead to larger non-audit service expenditures.

Original languageEnglish
Article number100356
JournalJournal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation
Volume41
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2020
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Elsevier Inc.

Keywords

  • Agency problem
  • Audit committee
  • Auditor independence
  • Corporate governance
  • Family firms
  • Non-audit service fees
  • UK

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance

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