Abstract
The activity of TiO2 in single and two-phase regions of the system ZrO2-TiO2 has been measured using solid state cells based on yttria-doped thoria (YDT) as the solid electrolyte at 1373 K. The cells used can be represented as: Pt, Ti0.07Pt0.93 + Zr1-xTixO2 / YDT / TiO2 + Ti 0.07Pt0.93, Pt Pt, Ti0.07Pt0.93 + Zr1-xTixO2 + ZrTiO4 / YDT / TiO 2 + Ti0.07Pt0.93, Pt In each cell the composition of Pt-Ti alloy was identical at both electrodes. The emf of the cell is therefore directly related to the activity of TiO2 in oxide phase or oxide phase mixture: αTiO2 = exp (-4FE/RT). The activity coefficient of TiO2 in the zirconia-rich solid solution with monoclinic structure (0.02 ≥ XTiO2 ≥ 0) can be expressed as: ln γTiO2 = 3.145 (1 - XTiO2)2 - 0.338 In the zirconia-rich solid solution with tetragonal structure (0.085 ≥ X TiO2 ≥ 0.03), the activity coefficient is given by: ln γTiO2 (± 0.012) = 2.354 (1 - XTiO2) 2 + 0.064 The standard Gibbs energy of formation of ZrTiO4 is -5650 (± 200) J/mol at 1373 K.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 203-208 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| Journal | High Temperature Materials and Processes |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2006 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:Grzymała-Busse Anna 03 2001 15 2 421 453 sagemeta-type Journal Article search-text The Organizational Strategies of Communist Parties in East Central Europe, 1945-1989 Anna Grzymala-Busse: The organizational strategies of the communist parties during the era of state socialism (1945-1989) are among the lesser-documented aspects of the parties' rule. Yet these strategies, consisting of the means of party control over society and internal personnel poli- cies within the party, underlay the communist parties' ability to reform and negotiate under communism. The less the parties re- lied on the loyalty of party members and extensive organizational networks as a way to control society, and the more pragmatic and skilled their elites, the more able the communist parties to inno- vate and implement policy reforms (however meager), and to ne- gotiate with the anticommunist opposition. Moreover, these strate- gies also influenced politics after the collapse of communism in 1989: they formed the collective historical record and the elite skills that determined how the communist parties would survive and suc- ceed after the regime collapse in 1989. The more the parties had encouraged pluralism within and outside their organizations, the more likely they were to gain a relatively favorable historical record and to adapt successfully to democracy. There were two aspects to the parties' organizational strategies. First, the parties used their organizations themselves to establish and maintain authority over society; through party organizational and membership networks, the nomenklatura system, and party purges designed to punish "deviants," the leadership ensured so- cietal compliance. These relations of power between the party and : I would like to thank Gary Bass, John Connelly, Timothy Dowling, and Vladimir Tis- maneanu for helpful comments. An earlier draft was presented at the "New Directions in the Study of East European State Socialism" workshop at Harvard University, 7-9 November 1997. East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 15, No. 2, pages 421-453. 421 ISSN 0888-3254; online ISSN 1533-8371 C 2001 by the American Council of Learned Societies. All rights reserved. Send requests for permission to reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California Press, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704-1223 society ranged from the Czech or East German saturation of so- ciety with party organizations and members and the assertion of direct party power over schooling and employment, to the rela- tive absence of the party from daily life in Poland and in Hun- gary, where party membership and organization rates were far lower, and considerable spheres of private economic and political activity made for greater societal autonomy from the party. Second, the parties' internal organizational practices-elite recruitment, advancement and turnover, and internal party pluralism-were used both to assert control over the party's make- up and to promote cohorts with specific skills and outlooks. Here, the variation ranged from recruitment exclusively from within the party ranks and promotion based chiefly on ideological loyalty, as in the Czech party, to the more pragmatic East German em- phasis on technocratic expertise, to the recruitment and co-op- tation of the intelligentsia in Poland, in Hungary, and even in Bul- garia. Thus, the subsequent strict control over the party stifled the rise of Czech elites with practical, portable skills, who could envision and implement reform. Ironically, however, it also al- lowed the rise of reformist Slovak elites. The Polish and Hun- garian parties, for their part, tended to recruit their elites from the outside, using political and administrative skills as criteria. They did so more consistently than the other parties-the Bul- garian communist party, for example, engaged in such co-opta- tion only during the period of late state socialism, in the late 1970s and beyond. As we will see, these twin practices, of societal con- trol and of personnel recruitment, were often intertwined-the more a party pursued societal saturation, the more it worried about the loyalty and reliability of the cadres who made up the party organization. In accounting for these patterns, scholars have posited that the differences in party strategies were the result of forces outside of the party. First, prewar configurations of political parties and their constituencies shaped the bargaining over regime type immediately after the Second World War.1 Thus, the communist mass parties in 1. The prewar patterns of bourgeois and socialist strength resulted in the postwar regime types, according to Herbert Kitschelt et al., Post-Communist Party Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 422 Organizational Strategies of Communist Parties East Germany and in Czechoslovakia, faced with fully democratic competition and highly mobilized urban middle strata and work- ing classes during the interwar period, eventually formed highly bureaucratized and repressive communist regimes.2 According to this analysis, the Polish and Hungarian parties, with their unmo- bilized interwar working classes and strong agrarian mobilization under semi-democratic interwar regimes, formed less bureaucra- tized regimes after the Second World War. These, in turn, were more likely to co-opt than to repress their potential opposition. Second, differences in the relationship with the Soviet Union3 have been used to explain the parties' organizational strategies- the more a given party was part of the USSR's security "core," the less it had to worry about having to ensure its political monop- oly, and was freer to pursue some liberalization. Alternatively, in the security "periphery," party rule was not as assured by the So- viet Union, especially in the early stages, and so the parties had to resort to repression and reliance on ideologically loyal comrades to enforce party control over society. Third, differences in the political cultures of the societies in- volved4 meant different degrees of acceptance and resistance to the communist project. Thus, where a strong working class or tradi- tionally pro-Russian feelings existed, communist parties could take full advantage and saturate society with party organizations with little resistance or need for negotiation. At the other end of the spectrum, where parties faced a population that was particularly resistant-dominated by agrarian mobilization, religious faith, or anti-Russian/Soviet sentiment-communist parties would have to find some way to compromise with these forces in order to re- main in power. These factors clearly contributed to the parties' organizational strategies but leave some developments unexplained. Prewar pat- terns had little influence in countries where the main political ac- tors who could continue prewar patterns were obliterated, as in 2. Kitschelt et al., ibid., chap. 1. 3. These are precisely documented in Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 4. Leslie Holmes, Politics in the Communist World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); and Stephen White, John Gardener, and George Schopflin, Communist Political Systems (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982). East European Politics and Societies 423 Poland.' Security priorities do not explain party strategy: Czech- oslovakia became a firm part of the Soviet security framework, yet the KSCi (Czechoslovak Communist Party) did little to relax its policies, even after Stalin's death. Moreover, loose ties to the Soviet Union do not explain the variation in the repression and control among the Romanian, Albanian, and Yugoslav parties. Nor does political culture explain these patterns fully: Poland and Slo- vakia were similar in their agrarianism and Catholicism, yet the party policies clearly diverged. Nor did religiosity mandate party policy: the Church was a prominent political and societal actor in Poland, but its relative weakness did not preclude similar party strategies in Hungary. This analysis of the communist parties of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary (with briefer consideration of the East Ger- man and Bulgarian cases) seeks to fill in some of these lacunae. While the initial differences in their organizational strategies were small, especially given the Stalinist brutality that followed the take- overs, they were steadily reinforced, both by deliberate replica- tion and by regime crises. As a result, by the 1980s, the parties had very different configurations of elites, patterns of negotiation be- tween the party and its opposition, and reform capabilities. These various configurations, in turn, implied divergent paths of tran- sition and distinct political possibilities for the communist parties themselves. Communist Take-overs and Regime Crises The communist captures of power after the Second World War led the parties to reach distinct conclusions regarding the kind of party organization that would best establish their authority, and thus, to adopt different organizational strategies. Specifically, the more the party came to power faced with powerful domestic or external opponents it was uncertain of defeating, the more it tended to view its organization as a means of establishing and re- taining power. Thus, in Czechoslovakia, where the free elections 5. Jan Gross, "The Social Consequences of War: Preliminaries to the Study of Imposition of Communist Regimes in East Central Europe," East European Politics and Societies 3:2 (Spring 1989): 198-214. 424 Organizational Strategies of Communist Parties of 1946 called into question communist legitimacy, the party at- tempted to saturate society with its organizations and member- ship networks, making many aspects of daily life dependent on party loyalty. Similarly, obsessed with West German "infiltration," the East German SED (Socialist Unity Party) had saturated so- ciety with an extensive network of party organizations, demands for ideological loyalty, and continual control, permeating "all ac- tivities on farms, and in factories, governmental agencies, the armed forces, and so on."6 Thus, even if socialism was compati- ble with the national traditions of East Germany or the Czech lands,7 the party could not rely on this compatibility to ensure its grip on power. In contrast, the more assured the party felt of its power, chiefly as a result of its "importation" by the Soviet Union, the less it viewed the party organization as relevant to its hold on rule. In- stead, such parties relied more on elite co-optation and societal engagement to retain the "legitimacy" of its governance. Thus, in Poland and in Hungary, the party organization itself and its ef- forts to saturate society played less of a role in maintaining party authority than the parties' attempts to negotiate with society through political liberalization and populist economic policies. To a lesser extent, the Bulgarian communist party in the 1960s and 1970s also co-opted the intelligentsia and implemented cycles of economic reforms. In short, not only did the postwar communist take-overs capture power for the parties, but they also first de- lineated how the party would go about establishing its authority: whether the party organization would be a means of control over society, or whether the organization would be perceived as less important than elite turnover and societal engagement as a way to establish popular compliance. The take-overs also set in motion the personnel policies that influenced the parties' subsequent development, including poli- cies of recruitment, advancement, turnover, and internal plural- ism. Aware of the bases for their take-over, the parties pursued different cadre policies within their organizations. The more the 6. Richard Staar, Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institu- tion Press, 1988), 108. 7. I am indebted to John Connelly for this point. East European Politics and Societies 425 party relied on its organization to control society, the more demanding its standards of ideological loyalty and uniformity. These, in turn, translated into willingness to open channels of party advancement and reward skill rather than ideological loyalty. By enforcing ideology rather than pragmatism, the personnel policies also affected the parties' subsequent ability to reform pol- icy and to negotiate with the opposition-after all, "closed" or "in- tramural" patterns of internal recruitment and advancement have led to orthodox, cautious, and largely conservative elites, while open" or "extramural" policies of advancement tend to foster a more innovative, less hidebound cohort. Similarly, higher rates of leadership turnover promote innovative and flexible policy mak- ing.8 They also keep the elites from becoming entrenched and cre- ate competition for prized positions. Regime crises strengthened these differences in the parties' in- ternal policies, sustaining these disinctions until the collapse of the communist regimes in 1989. Where the parties discounted their members and minimized their direct control of society, their response to the crises was more likely to involve removing discred- ited party leaders and engaging society through reforms and ne- gotiation. Where the party elites saw the party organization as the guarantee of their authority and control over society, on the other hand, they were more likely to hold it responsible for the failings of the regime, and thus seek to "improve" its reliability after regime crises through purges and punitive actions. The responses to these crises thus not only reflected party cleavages, patterns of popu- lar mobilization, and international pressures,9 but also the par- ties' organization and its control over society. While there were changes over time-most notably, with the end of "national com- munism" and the post-Stalinist "thaw," which relaxed ideologi- cal demands and abolished the more severe party punishments- these patterns held throughout the postwar period. 8. Kenneth Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Uni- versity Press, 1967), 46ff. Mattei Dogan, Pathways to Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), 3. For the argument that greater turnover leads to quicker and more re- sponsive reaction to change, see also Robert Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), 147, and 67. 9. See Grzegorz Ekiert, The State Against Society (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). 426 Organizational Strategies of Communist Parties Czechoslovakia The Czechoslovak Communist party captured power as a mass political party, using its extensive organizational networks and a large membership to mobilize voters. It won over 40 percent of the vote in the free elections in 194610 and played a leading role in the government coalition that followed. Dissatisfied with the pace of political change, the party fomented a crisis among its coali- tion partners in February 1948 (several noncommunist ministers resigned, without naming replacements) and took power com- pletely in a coup d'etat. Since it had relied on its 20,000 organiza- tions and close to 2.5 million party members (or over 25 percent of the adult population) in 1946-48 to obtain electoral support, to eliminate political competitors, and to mobilize forces during the coup, the KSC continued to emphasize its mass party charac- ter, even as it abolished elections. Having successfully emerged from domestic competition, the party's leaders considered the party structures and members as the mainstay of their power. As Central Committee members ar- gued, "the strength of our party rests in organization, whereas the strength of other parties rests on tradition."1" A large, loyal membership was both an enormous political resource and the only proof the party needed of its legitimacy. It would guarantee the party's sustained control over society and would retain the same structures that had brought the party power in the free elections of 1946. It was also a way of "crowding out" other political forces-other political parties had also sought mass party mem- bership, and the KSCi saw its gains as their losses. Much as the East German SED, the KSCi saw a mass party as a way to establish firm control over society.12 As a result, the party subsequently counted on the "saturation" 10. The KSC received considerably less in Slovakia. Its high Czech support has been ex- plained as a function of the banning of the Agrarian party, the pro-Russian sentiment following liberation, and the gains in areas where Germans had been expelled following the war (Zdenek Suda Zealots and Rebels: A History of the Communist Party of Czech- oslovakia [Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980], 196ff). 11. S[A Fond 01, sv 2 aj 12 2. Diskuse k referatu S. Gottwalda. 30.5.1946. Soucek and Svermovi. 12. Staar, Communist Regimes, 97. East European Politics and Societies 427 of society by party members and structures to help establish its authority as legitimate and to maintain its control of Czechoslo- vakia. Czech party membership rates were twice as high as those in the neighboring countries.13 By 1949, the Czech party had suc- ceeded in infusing society with party organizations-only 3.4 per- cent of communities were without party organizations a year after the communist take-over.14 Similarly, only 3.3 percent of the communities were without a party organization in Slovakia by 1954.15 By 1989, a party organization existed for every 286 Czechs and for every 400 Slovaks. As a party journal explained as late as the mid-1970s, "an effort must be made to ensure that there is no factory, no important workplace, and no community where there is not a primary organization of the Czechoslovak Communist Party."'16 The only country with comparable saturation rates was East Germany. Obsessed with withstanding potential West Ger- man assault, the SED infiltrated society to the point that anywhere from 13 to 17 percent of the population was in the party.17 By the late 1980s, there were 96,000 party organizations,18 or one for every 175 East Germans. As befitted the vanguard of the workers, the KSC consistently pursued "proper" blue-collar members.19 As a result, the per- centage of Czechoslovak party members in the intelligentsia peaked at less than a third-the KSC' was the one party to insist on its "working class" character until the very end. Even in East Germany, with a 28 percent intelligentsia share in the party, the white-collar segment was relatively over-represented. Elsewhere, intelligentsia and white-collar rates were even higher-for exam- 13. At the time of its take over in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, the KSC numbered 2.5 million members, or over 25.3 percent of the Czech population and 9.1 percent of the Slovak. Afterwards, anywhere from 13 to 16 percent of Czechs were in the party (prior to the debilitating Prague Spring purge), as were 6-7 percent of the Slovaks. 14. Karel Kaplan, Utvdfeni generalnilinie vystavby socialismu v (eskoslovensku; od tinora do IX sjezdu KSC (Praha: Academia, 1966), 166. Thus, 400 Czech villages had no party organizations in 1949. At the time, there were 11,695 such communities in the Czech Lands, and 3,361 in Slovakia. 15. SA UV KSS Sekretariat. 1954/Inf a.! 54-7.9 Karton c. 91. 16. Zivot Strany, 15, 1976, 12. 17. Holmes, Communist World, 142. 18. Staar, Communist Regimes, 108. 19. The 1980 party guidelines issued by the Central Committee of the KSC called for 70 percent workers, 20 percent technical and intellectual workers, and 10 percent of agri- cultural workers in the party. 428 Organizational Strategies of Communist Parties ple, in Bulgaria, their share of party membership topped 36 per- cent by the 1970s.20 At the same time, since Czech blue-collar jobs were not made as dependent on party membership, there was less incentive for blue-collar workers to join, and far fewer sanctions to prevent their leaving. For example, while white-collar workers were demoted to menial jobs if they were expelled from the party, blue-collar workers faced no such punishment. Moreover, employment in the state sector was made exclusively the province of the party. As a result, the Czech intelligentsia and white-collar workers were the group most eager to join the party, but faced the highest ideolog- ical barriers in doing so.21 Similar patterns appeared in the party aparat. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the KSC's long-held anti- intellectualism, levels of education had no influence on whether one became a Czech party aparat worker.22 Even in the late 1980s, when well-educated technocrats in Poland and in Hungary dom- inated the party aparat and nomenklatura, the KSC' proudly noted that nearly 90 percent of its aparat came from communist worker families. Concerned with the purity of party ranks as a mainstay of its organizational saturation and control,23 the Czech communist leaders purged their membership regularly, and at higher rates than any other party. In the 1948-1951 period, two purges expelled 750,000 members, or 32 percent of the party membership.24 Purges of the state administration sent over 150,000 people from white- collar to factory jobs in the three-year period after the takeover.25 20. L. A. Dellin, "The Communist Party of Bulgaria," in Stephen Fischer-Galati, ed., The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 60. 21. Gordon Wightman and Archie Brown, "Changes in the Level of Membership and Social Composition of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 1945-73," Soviet Studies (July 1975): 396-417, esp. 409-410. Wightman argues that the drive to get more workers in the 1970s was an attempt to further control industrial sectors more effectively. 22. Raymond Sin-Kwok Wong, "The Social Composition of the Czechoslovak and Hun- garian Communist Parties in the 1980s," Social Forces (September 1996): 61-90, 78. 23. SA Fond UWV KSS Predsednictvo 1981/1541/81-3.2 Karton 6. 1596. As late as 1981, the Czechoslovak Communist Party still spoke of "characteristic care for the upholding of party rules, ensuring the discipline of the communist and purity of party ranks." 24. Karel Kaplan, Political Persecution in Czechoslovakia. Research project "Crises in So- viet-Type Systems," no. 3 (Koln: Index, 1983). 25. Kaplan, ibid., 13. East European Politics and Societies 429 After the Prague Spring, an estimated 70,000 to 100,000 were fired from their jobs26 and denied all but menial employment. Seventy- five percent of the expelled communist party members were sent to perform manual labor.27 The specter of ideological disloyalty dominated Czech just- ifications of the purges. The KSC still railed against "non-Leninist thinking" as late as 1988, and insisted that it was "wholly natural and logical"28 that the party demanded ideological responsibility from each communist, insisting that "bolshevization" was a "fully relevant and timely [aktualni' " party goal.29 Thus, the most likely cause for purging in the Czech lands was ideological insubordi- nation or "incorrect views," especially in the post-Prague Spring purge of nonconformist or reformist movements. The result was the elimination of any overt reformist sentiment in the party until 1989, through continual checks, controls, and demands of more criticism and self-criticism.30 Moreover, the Czech and East German parties were perhaps the most persistent and successful in making society dependent on the party, in areas as basic as education and employment.31 Member- ship in the orthodox Communist Youth Union was a prerequi- site for higher education throughout the period, and "political cri- teria [were] always applied" in selection for both high school and university.32 Moreover, 550,000 jobs were directly vetted by Czechoslovak party organs in the mid-1980s,33 in contrast with 270,000 in Poland (with over twice the working population of Czechoslovakia) or the even smaller number in Hungary during the same time period.34 Czechs and Slovaks were not allowed to 26. Milan gime&ka, The Restoration of Order: The Normalization of Czechoslovakia 1969-1976. (London: Verso, 1984), 65. 27. Hans Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia since 1945 (London: Routledge, 1989), 110. 28. Gustav Husak, Zivot Strany, 11 December 1970. 29. ZivotStrany, 5/1976. 30. 2ivot Strany, 14/1971. 31. Otto U1c, Politics in Czechoslovakia. (San Francisco, Cal.: W. H. Freeman and Co, 1974), 105. 32. Kaplan, Political Persecution, 6. 33. Renner, History of Czechoslovakia, 111; Polityka, 2 September 1989. More conserva- tive figures (Kaplan) place the number of Czechoslovak nomenklatura posts at 180-250 thousand. 34. The Hungarian system differed in that while the direct nomenklatura ranged from 10,000 in the mid-1980s to 90,000, the party held discretionary "advisory" rights to an additional 350,000 posts. 430 Organizational Strategies of Communist Parties travel as freely as Poles and Hungarians and were subject to hu- miliating interviews, courtesy of the State Security Agency, after their return.35 Censorship was also far more strict, as subscriptions to many western journals were forbidden, and domestic publica- tions were under stricter control than in either Poland or Hun- gary. In much the same way, the SED determined all access to em- ployment and schooling and remained "interested in all facets of a party member's life."36 The KSC also directly supervised "its" employees, since it saw party presence in the factories both as an extension of party agi- tation and a way to ensure production quality.37 In the mid-1980s, over 560,000 interrogations were held with state employees, with 100,000 cadres told to raise their expertise and communist loyal- ties. Their intelocutor? The party's Central Control and Revision Commission, which was theoretically in charge of party discipline and membership. Moreover, there were few other hopes of employ- ment. In contrast, Polish agriculture remained uncollectivized and in private hands,38 and a private sector existed in Hungary and in Poland for both customer services and petty manufacturing. Those fired from their jobs could thus turn to other forms of employment-no such alternatives existed in Czechoslovakia. In their internal organizational policies, the conservative Czech party leaders deliberately replicated a pattern of "closed" elite advancement-elites could only rise within and through the party ranks. After 1945, the purges and recruitment policies of the Czech communist party rewarded neither education nor extramural ex- perience, but ideological loyalty. Anxious to reassert control, and suspicious of any innovations that smacked of the 1968 reform movement, the party promoted only "safe" comrades, tested by 35. For example, over 1 million Hungarians had travelled abroad in 1970, and over 5 mil- lion did so in 1980. Over 870,000 Poles travelled abroad in 1970, and nearly 7 million did in 1980. In contrast, the figures for Czechoslovakia are 400,000 and 870,000, re- spectively. 36. Staar, Communist Regimes, 110 and 180. 37. SA Fond [V KSS Predsednictvo. 1970/1179/70-8.2/Karton 6. 1274. 38. Party leaders admitted that 6 years after the announcement of collectivization in 1949, 6 percent of farms and 10 percent of land was collectivized. Faced with such levels of success, the party abandoned the policy in 1956. IV Plenum KC PZPR, 15-16.7.1955, quoted by Wladystaw Wazniewski, Walka polityczna w kierownictwie PPR i PZPR 1944-64. (Toruii; Adam Marszatek, 1991), 53. East European Politics and Societies 431 years, if not decades, of party work. Prospective members had to apply directly to the party and could be rejected on ideological grounds. Advancement occurred mostly through progression up- wards in the party into increasingly ideologically stagnant elite lay- ers, so that conformist and orthodox members were the primary ones to advance in the party. The overwhelming majority of Czech and Slovak leaders were longtime party activists.39 Although the levels of education increased with time, party leaders had no international experience, and their schooling was either at the Prague or at the Moscow party schools.40 The youth organization, completely under party control after 1968, provided no reformist elites.41 As a result, the Czech party elites in the 1980s were ide- ologically hidebound and eventually unable to keep up with the transition of 1989. Not even the East German SED, whose "effectiveness in sup- pressing dissent within its own ranks while penetrating and closely monitoring th rest of society probably exceeded that of other East European ruling parties,"42 could match the Czech stagnation. For all the lack of toleration of differences in opinion, and its demands of ideological loyalty, the SED nonetheless coopted technocrats to a greater degree than the KSC and recognized individual per- formance and skill. As a result, upward mobility no longer took place exclusively within the party.43 The rates of elite turnover further demonstrate the Czech party's conservative stance towards the role of the party organi- zation. In its effort to prevent the resurrection of "right-wing op- portunism," the KSC Politburo did not turn over its mid-level cadres and did not bring in any new members (unless an incum- 39. Sharon Wolchik, "Economic Performance and Political Change in Czechoslovakia," in Charles Bukowski and Mark Cichock, eds., Prospects for Change in Socialist Sys- tems (New York: Praeger, 1987), 48. 40. Karel Kaplan, Aparat UV KSC v letech 1948-68. Prague: Sesity Ustavu Pro Soudobe D6jiny, Sv. 10, 1993, 13. 41. Its head, Vasil Mohorita, became the successor party's first leader and concluded the party's regeneration efforts in mid-1990 by arguing that since he had removed Marx- ist books and symbols from the party offices, the party had reformed. 42. Thomas Baylis, "Eastern Germany," in Zoltan Barany and Ivan Volgyes, eds., The Lega- cies of Communism in Eastern Europe (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1995), 123. 43. Manfred Grote, "The Socialist Unity Party of Germany," in Fischer-Galati, Communist Parties, 188-89. 432 Organizational Strategies of Communist Parties bent died) until 1987, when MilovJakes's dogmatic wing took over from the conservative pragmatist Gustav Husak.44 As a result, on average only 16 percent of the Politburo leadership changed every year, less than half the rate in Poland. Moreover, elites who left did so as a result of retirement or death-there was minimal hor- izontal movement to other positions. The party's response to its regime crisis also reflected its con- cept of the party organization as the mainstay of party rule. The major reform movement, the Prague Spring of 1968, began within the party, partly because the KSC had so penetrated society by that point that few centers of independent thought existed out- side of the party, unlike the relatively free academic departments and scientific institutes in Poland and in Hungary. The movement began with the formulation of reform alternatives by three com- mittees attached to the central party leadership in the 1960s. The suggestions for improving the economy eventually led to calls for political reform, the ascension of the reformist Alexander Dubcek into the party leadership, and eventually, an unprecedented renewal of both the party and its relationship to the society.45 After the Soviet-led invasion crushed the Spring, however, all these gains were reversed. Since the impetus for the Czech liberal- ization had come from within the party, it instilled an even greater fear of pluralism within the party leadership. The party cadres' "treachery" had to be punished. The new leadership reasoned that without a reliable membership, it could not count on an effective and loyal public support, and so the Czechoslovak response focused on cleansing the membership ranks. The result was both a renewed ideologization of party life and a clamping down on any "danger- ous initiatives. Entire academic institutes and departments were summarily eliminated, the press and media enervated completely, 44. Josef Blahoz, "Political Parties in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics: First Steps Toward the Rebirth of Democracy," in Kay Lawson, ed., How Political Parties Work: Perspectives from Within (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), 230. 45. See H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976); Hans Renner, Dejiiny Cieskoslovenskapo roku 1945 (Bratislava: SAP, 1993); Vladimir V. Kusin, The Czechoslovak Reform Movement, 1968 (Santa Barbara, Cal.: ABC-Clio, 1973); id. Political Grouping in the Czechoslovak Re- form Movement (New York, Columbia University Press, 1972); id., The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring: The Development of Reformist Ideas in Czechoslovakia, 1956-1967 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971). East European Politics and Societies 433 and constant loyalty checks made party members acutely aware of the party leadership's desire for ideological reliability.46 In the most dramatic purge in the history of state socialism, over 28 percent of KSC members were expelled from the party within a year following the Prague Spring.47 Moreover, expulsion meant not only loss of party membership, but of employment and schooling opportunities as well, not only for the expellees but their entire families. Subsequently, constant loyalty checks made the re- maining party members acutely aware of the party leadership's de- sire for ideological reliability.48 The purge was designed to pre- vent any future reformist deviations, while the ensuing policies of societal oppression and policy stagnation were to demonstrate that the party was once again fully in control. Even more important, since 1968 itself was a reform that began within the party, no further political or economic reforms were con- sidered by the party, for fear of a similarly disastrous loss of con- trol. In contrast, even the trauma that followed in 1953 in East Ger- many, producing the enormous purges that it did, did not preclude some (minor) future policy alterations by the SED.49 The KSC doc- ument after 1969, "The Lessons of the Crisis Development" (Pouceni z krizoveho vfroje) denounced any attempt at political or economic reform, either then or in the future. As late as 1989, the KSC leader Milos Jakes argued that any revision or attempt to come to terms with 1968 would mean the party would fall apart.50 Nor did the party allow internal pluralism. Any reform- minded party member bold enough to attempt to disseminate his or her views would be rewarded with both an expulsion and loss of employment. Instead of capitalizing on its reform potential of 1968, the party deliberately eliminated its residues, partly because of its fear that party foment would once again destabilize the polity. In the 1980s, following both the rise of the opposition Charter '77'and Polish Solidarity, the party rank and file grew in- 46. Barbara Wolfe Jancar, Czechoslovakia and the Absolute Monopoly of Power (New York: Praeger, 1971), 125 47. Wightman and Brown, "Changes in the Level of Membership," 208. 48. Wolfe, Czechoslovakia and the Absolute Monopoly of Power 125. 49. Interview with Andre Brie, 7 July 1998, Berlin, PDS Headquarters. 50. Interview in February 1989 Partelet, quoted in Rudolf T6k6s, Hungary's Negotiated Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 316. 434 Organizational Strategies of Communist Parties creasingly dissatisfied with the stagnation, and produced several localized, informal discussion clubs.51 These, however, had nei- ther the connections to the party elite nor the access to decision making to become full-fledged reform alternatives. Instead, they largely foundered at the local level or were kept out of central- ized, and largely unchanged, decision-making structures. There- fore, party reformers in 1989, though they could now openly voice their concerns and offer alternatives, had little access to the cen- tral power structures. The more reactionary elites, with little commitment to party transformation beyond the absolutely nec- essary, instead took over power within the party. However, in their desire to control the Czechoslovak party, the Czech leadership created the space for Slovak reform potential. Earlier, the Communist party did less well in the 1946 elections in Slovakia, and never organized as thoroughly: the membership rate at the time of the 1948 takeover was 9.1 percent of adult Slo- vaks, about a third of the rates in the Czech lands. Nor were the Slovak party members or leaders seen as particularly committed to establishing communist rule. Therefore, the Slovak component was rapidly forced to join the Czech party.52 As a result, the Sl- vak party was a subservient and stagnant party backwater until 1968 and the federalization of the country. In having to cede al- most all its authority to the Prague center, the Slovak commu- nists lost prestige within Slovakia and became an instrument of the Czech leadership. Having centralized control after 1946, the Czech party allowed the Slovaks some administrative autonomy after the Prague Spring with the federalization of Czechoslovakia, which partly addressed the Czech domination of Slovakia under the auspices of "the Czechoslovak People's Socialist Republic." Since the Slovak party was not as active in the Prague Spring, and since the Slovak party 51. For more on the groups and their fates after 1989, see Anna Grzymala-Busse, "Re- form Efforts in the Czech and Slovak Communist Parties and their Successors, 1988-1993," East European Politics and Societies (Fall 1998): 442-71. 52. The Slovak communists played a considerable role in the Slovak National Uprising, directed against the Hitlerite puppet government of wartime Slovakia, led by Mon- signor Jozef Tiso. The considerable gains they made were lost, however, when they actively participated in the "Prague agreements," which ceded Slovak autonomy to Prague and then made the Slovak Communist party a part of the Prague-centered Czechoslovak Communist party. East European Politics and Societies 435 was considered slightly more liberal than its Czech counterpart,53 Slovak party members were not purged as heavily. While districts where 20 percent of members were expelled were put forth as ex- amples, others, like the intellectual centers in Bratislava, only had a tiny percentage of expellees.54 Those who were expelled could also count on support from many of their old comrades. Moreover, since the intelligentsia was so small in Slovakia, and its members knew each other very well, there was a hesitation to punish intellectuals. Despite the ostensible federalization, the centralization of power in the Czechoslovak Communist party meant that as orders flowed from Prague to the Slovak regional party heads, Bratislava (the capital of Slovakia) was largely neglected by party supervision and control commissions. As a result, Slovak reformists survived through an oversight-they spent most of the 1970s and 1980s in the Marxist-Leninist Institute of the Central Committee of the KSS, the Slovak party's main theoretical and programmatic organ, far away from both party supervision and access to party decision- making. While the Czech party and its institutes stagnated,55 pock- ets of Slovak reformists could thus survive. These young scholars were unable to advance into the party's leadership prior to 1989, and thus gained far more theoretical than practical experience in policy making and implementation. Nevertheless, they were ready to assume power at a time when most older, established party officials were either too disoriented or frightened to take charge immediately after November 1989. Similarly, pockets of East Ger- man reform thought survived in the Berlin SED Academy of So- cial Sciences, and their proposals helped to shape the transforma- tion of the SED into the PDS after 1989.56 53. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1966), 50. 54. Politologickl Kabinet SAV. Slovenska Spolocnost v krizovych rokoch 1967-1970. Zbornik studii III. (Bratislava: SAV 1992), 186. 55. An exception is the Institute of Economic Planning, where the likes of Viclav Klaus and Vladimir Dlouhy first became prominent. This same institute also employed Miloslav Ransdorf, currently the Czech successor's party main apologist. Unlike the Slovak Institute of Marxism-Leninism, however, the Institute of Economic Planning had no direct elite ties that would allow its members to ascend to the top of the suc- cessor party immediately. 56. Daniel Ziblatt, "Putting Humpty-Dumpty Together Again: Communism's Collapse and the Reconstruction of the East German Ex-Communist Party," German Politics and Society (Spring 1998): 1-29. 436 Organizational Strategies of Communist Parties As a result, while the Czech party elites were not only unable to implement political liberalization or economic reform, but also incapable of transforming the party and adapting to democracy, their Slovak counterparts were capable of preserving a more di- verse membership and gathering some measure of public support under communism, given their partial fulfillment of Slovak national aspirations. Not surprisingly, the Slovak (and to a lesser extent, the East-German) elites were more successful in adapting to democracy after 1989 and becoming accepted political players. Poland Imported from Moscow and supported by the Soviet Army, the Polish Communist party was painfully aware of its lack of sup- port after the Second World War. In their analyses, party leaders admitted that the Soviet presence was "crucial" to its coming to power.57 Party leaders therefore never allowed a free election. As one enraged Politburo member explained in February 1946: "we cannot allow 'loose' elections and an unfettered mobilization of fascist elements ... we cannot allow a repeat of the Hungarian ex- periment [in free elections]."58 By 1947, party leader Wiadystaw Gomulka dropped any pretense of elections, referring instead to the capture of power as a "social revolution" and an "overthrow of the government."59 The Polish party thus came to power through electoral fraud and coalitional chicanery, faced with pop- ular distrust and enmity. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Polish party regarded its newly recruited members as unreliable and uncommitted.60 Party mem- 57. Archiw Akt6w Nowych, the Polish National Archive, Archive of New Records. (AAN), 295/11-2/KC 20-26. 5. 1945. See also Aleksander Kochaiiski, ed., Protokoty postedzen Biura Politycznego KC PPR 1944-45 (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 1992), 81ff. 58. AAN 295/IV-2 K1-123 PPR KC. CKKP: protokoly i sprawozdania 1946-8. In im- mediate postwar Poland, "fascist" was the term used by communists to describe all independent political actors, including the second World War resistance groups, the London government in exile, and members of political parties. 59. AAN 295/VII-213 KC PPR. 19.7.1947. 60. Andrzej Palczak, Procesy Stalinizacji w Polsce w latach 1947-56. (Zabrze: Wydawnictwo APEX, 1996), 33. AAN 295/IV-1 PPR KC. Early in the postwar era, the chair of the Central Party Revision Commission noted that they were especially embittered by the influx of religious Roman Catholics into the party. In another instance, party sec- retaries were reported to have started a collection campaign for a church monstrance East European Politics and Societies 437 bers were as suspect in their loyalties as they were irrelevant to the takeover.6' Polish party officials did not even know how many mem- bers the party had in late 1945, while their Czech counterparts had precise figures by that point.62 Nor did the Polish leaders point to the party membership as a source of legitimization of their power. Instead, they complained that any increase in numbers weakened the party,63 and argued that past mass membership drives were "in- separable" from loss of quality.64 As a result, the party never pur- sued the sort of mass, committed membership the Czech party did- by 1948, the PZPR (Polish United Workers Party) managed to recruit only 4.3 percent of the population, and subsequently aver- aged about 5.4 percent of the adult population as its members. In contrast to the Czech saturation of society with party or- ganizations and representatives, a fourth of Polish villages had no party organization as late as 1987.65 In 1958, over half of Polish villages were without party organizations, a portion that de- creased to 29 percent by 1965. This translated into 21,000 of 41,000 villages without party organizations, down to 12,000 villages without organizations in 1965. By 1989, there was a basic party organization for every 500 Poles, in contrast to one for every 286 Czechs. The number of central party aparat employees reflected these differences-by 1965, there were more central party aparat workers in the Czech lands than in Poland (even though Poland's population was over 3.5 times that of the Czech lands), and these differences persisted.66 The leadership's attitudes towards the aparat are also revealing: by 1945, while the Czechs had full data among the workers entrusted to their care-and collected a staggering sum (295/IV- 2: 20.2.1946 meeting of KC PPR KKKP). 61. AAN 295/I/20. 62. AAN 295/1/20. 63. Wladyslaw Gomulka, in AAN 295/II-1. 6-7.7.1945. KC Plenum. A few days later, Gomulka acknowledged that a real mass party, if it could be achieved, would be "use- ful" in elections (AAN 295/11-3/11 12.7. 1945). 64. Edward Babiuch, quoted in Grazyna Pomian, ed., Protokol tzw. Komisji Grabskiego (Miedzyzakladowa Struktura "Solidarnosci," 1987), 28. 65. Nowe Drogi, 1987. The Peasants' party was to be the chief representative of the coun- tryside and its interests. 66. Due to the dominance of the Czech party center over its supposed partner in the Czech- oslovak federation, the Slovak aparat was a relatively smaller fraction of the total. De- spite the 3:2 parity that was to reflect the population differences, the Slovak aparat size was often a fourth of the Czech. 438 Organizational Strategies of Communist Parties on aparat number and organization, the Polish party knew nei- ther the number nor placement of its aparat workers.67 Even during the otherwise ideology-bound Stalinist era, the Pol- ish PZPR unofficially courted the intelligentsia.68 The Polish party emphasized that the party rules did not mandate any par- ticular composition of the party.69 A Polish regional report noted in 1953 that more highly educated workers were needed in the aparat, the better to work with intellectuals.70 By 1966, Trybuna Ludu, the party journal, argued that "the scientist, the engineer or the doctor, the teacher or the economist are wanted in the party."'71 Within a decade, official Polish elite recruitment policies stopped favoring proletarian origins (as they had in the ideolog- ically more rigorous 1940s and early 1950s), and party workers became increasingly better educated by the 1970s.72 By 1981, Pol- ish leader Edward Babiuch was perfectly satisfied to report that only 21 percent of the party were workers.73 Nor did the party pursue particularly loyal communists: by the 1970s, a tacit un- derstanding emerged between party members and their leaders, so that the vast majority of party members attended religious serv- ices, baptized their children, and even joined en masse the oppo- sition trade union Solidarity in 1980-81.74 Unlike the Czech or East German cases, both the Polish and Hungarian parties made peace with the private "deviations" of their members. Even the Bulgarian party, for all of Zhivkov's obsessions with loyalty, low- ered ideological demands in the Theses of 1976.75 67. Kochaiiski, ed., Protokoly posiedzefi, 26. 68. AAN AZHP 295/IlI, 23.11.1948, and AAN 295/11-3 11-12.VII.1945 Plenum KC. 69. AAN AZHP 295/111,23.11.1948, and AAN 195/11-3 11-12.VII.1945 Plenum KC. (Try- buna Ludu, 8 July 1966.) 70. AAN 237/VII-2337, Wydzial Organizacyjny-Komitet Warszawski, 19.1.1953 report. 71. Trybuna Ludu, 8 July 1966. 72. Jacek Wasilewski, "The Patterns of Bureaucratic Elite Recruitment in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s," Soviet Studies 4 (1990): 743-57, 747. 73. Nowe Drogi 1 (1981). 74. This is not to say that the Polish party had ignored internal dissent. In 1981, General Jaruzelski purged both the orthodox and the reformist "wings" in the party. More- over, the PZPR had earlier made employment and schooling dependent on party loy- alties-in 1945, Polish Politburo member Roman Zambrowski argued that no one could get a job without party membership (AAN 295/IV-1). However, he went on to argue that this policy backfired-the people became increasingly resentful, and the party gained no political benefit.) 75. Dellin, "Communist Party of Bulgaria," 59. East European Politics and Societies 439 Moreover, the Polish and Hungarian parties not only expelled far fewer members than the Czech, but attached less significance to the loss of membership. The Polish and Hungarian parties struck 300,000 and 179,000 respectively from the membership lists, amounting to 20 percent and 16 percent of the membership dur- ing the same period of Stalin-mandated "cleansing of the party ranks" (1948-1953). After 1969, the total expulsions amounted to 77,000 in Poland and 23,000 in Hungary, compared to the 71,000 expelled from the KSC' in 1969 alone. Even in the most oppressive years of state socialism, an addi- tional 160,000 members in Poland and 130,000 in Hungary left of their free will, simply by either not showing up for party meet- ings or not submitting their cards for exchange. Only 20.5 per- cent of the KSC members who left did so of their own accord, in contrast with 35 percent of the Polish members and 42 percent of the Hungarian departures.76 Polish and Hungarian party members in general were far more likely to leave of their own accord-for example, following the rise of Solidarity, over 700,000 members left the Polish PZPR in protest during 1980-81, while the Hun- garian party lost about 20,000 members to lack of interest each year in the late 1970s and 1980s. Similarly, the Polish party enforced far less societal dependence on the party, allowing agriculture to remain uncollectivized and making education largely independent of party membership. For example, by the late 1980s, party membership figures among stu- dents verged on the comic: in 1987, the party reported 879 student members among its 2 million-plus ranks.77 A large private sector was allowed to function in the economy, and Poles lived under far fewer strictures than their Czechoslovak neighbors. Most no- tably, the Roman Catholic Church was never as persecuted as in Czechoslovakia or even in Hungary. In its internal advancement policies, the PZPR pursued com- munist youth organization (Socjalistyczny Zwi4zek Studentow 76. SUA Fond 02/4 sv. 15 aj. 20 bod 1.29.11.1971. This includes many members who were pressured to "resign." Most of these were blue-collar workers, who had little to fear from party resignations. 77. Antoni Sulek, "The Polish United Worker's Party: From Mobilization to Non-Rep- resentation." Soviet Studies (July 1990): 499-611, 503. 440 Organizational Strategies of Communist Parties Polskich [SZSP], earlier known as the ZSP and the ZMP) leaders who, effectively educated in politicking, were hungry for a chance to exercise their skills. Given the persistent conflict and distrust between society and the party, the latter needed a team of capa- ble negotiators and administrators. The party youth auxiliaries served as a candidate pool, and their milieu a training ground, for future elites in a setting marked less by ideology than by prag- matic problem-solving; democratic voting procedures made po- litical bargaining and coalition forming the key to attaining lead- ership roles.78 The party funded the youth organizations as part of the budgets of individual academic institutions, rather than channeling funds through a centralized organization, which gave the youth league considerable autonomy. The regional structure further meant that future elites would learn how to win succes- sive elections, manipulate coalitions, and achieve successively higher positions, all the while learning legal and administrative norms.79 In short, the youth organization acted as a "school for democracy. "80 Many future party leaders advanced in these parallel organiza- tions. Throughout the 1970s, leaders of the youth organization moved into lower leadership positions in the party, advancing from there. By 1986, for example, 35 percent of the first secretaries had been youth organization leaders,81 and 80 percent of high-rank- 78. Mobilization itself creates further network ties, which then facilitate further mobi- lization. (Roger Gould, "Multiple Networks and Mobilization in the Paris Commune, 1871," American Sociological Review [December 1991]: 716-29). 79. Rzeczpospolita, 13-14 April 1996, 3. The youth organization members, for example, learned trade laws long before anyone else had, giving them a considerable advantage when the market was liberalized in 1990. 80. Ewa Wilk, "Ordynacka rz4dzi Polska,," Polityka (23 December 1995); 20-26. At the same time, the pre-1989 opposition may have received very different "training." Karol Modzelewski argues that the conspiratorial conditions under which the opposition worked in Poland and in the Czech Republic meant that "taking great personal risks, they develop a special type of loyalty. Conspiracy unites those who struggle together, rather than with sympathizers who, although passive, nevertheless make up the move- ment's social base. That is how a community of veterans is born. If it takes over power, it can easily result in a 'Republic of Buddies.' Although Tadeusz Mazowiecki did not engage in this demoralizing practice, it was already evident that the most important reference point for Solidarity's leaders was its own political elite rather than their so- cial base among workers" (Karol Modzelewski, "Where did Solidarity Go?" Uncap- tive Minds [Winter-Spring 1994]: 63-72, 69). 81. Paul Lewis, PoliticalAuthority and Party Secretaries in Poland 1975-1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 294. East European Politics and Societies 441 ing party bureaucrats had been members.82 Extramural advance- ment became so prevalent that only 6 of the 24 party Politburo members in 1987 had advanced from within, and even these were more educated, pragmatic elites, in keeping with the standard set by the youth organization graduates.83 Nor did the elites stagnate in their positions. An average of 32.5 percent of the Politburo leadership changed every year in Poland, twice the rate of Czechoslovak turnover. Moreover, while former Czech elites either retired into obscurity of simply died, Polish elites were part of a constant shifting of personnel from one party position to another. Edward Gierek, the Polish party leader from 1968 to 1980, instituted the "cadre carousel" and constantly "para- chuted" appointees from one region to another. As a result of the PZPR's recruitment policies, the new party leadership in 1990 consisted almost exclusively of youth organi- zation alumni.84 The first leader of the Polish successor party, Alek- sander Kwasniewski, graduated from the youth organization to become the government's minister of youth in the 1980s. Similarly, LeszekJaskiewicz and Jerzy Szmajdzinski, two of the Polish Com- munist party successor's leaders, were both elected to youth league chairmanships in sec'ret and direct ballots in 1981 and the late 1980s, respectively.85 Several postcommunist leaders in Poland, including two prime ministers and the president, were also mem- bers, as were numerous ministers, ambassadors, and other lead- ing politicians after 1989.86 The regime crises reflected the loose coupling between party 82. Jacek Wasilewski, "The Patterns of Bureaucratic Elite Recruitment in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s," Soviet Studies 42 (1990): 749-50. 83. Jacek Wasilewski, ed., KonsolidacJa Elitpolitycznych w Polsce 1991-1993 (Warsaw: PAN ISP, 1994). 84. The notable exception was Leszek Miller, an ostensible representative of the conser- vatives within the party. 85. Trybuna Ludu, 27 April 1981. 86. These include such SdRP (Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland) and post-1989 government notables as: Aleksander Kwasniewski, Jozef Oleksy, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Grzegorz Kolodko, Dariusz Rosati, Marek Borowski, Ryszard Czarny, Marek Siwiec, Jerzy Koiminski, Jerzy SzmajdziAski, Boguslaw Liberadzki, Jerzy Kropiwnicki, Stefan Olszowski, Hieronim Kubiak, and Manfred Gorywoda. A re- lated source of party cadres was the Central School of Planning and Statistics (Szkola Gl6wna Planowania I Statystyki [SGPiS]), which produced such future government leaders as Leszek Balcerowicz, Dariusz Rosati, Grzegorz Kolodko, and Andrzej Ole- chowski. The SZSP youth organization was especially powerful at the SGPiS. 442 Organizational Strategies of Communist Parties and society and the lack of the party's reliance on its organization. Poles repeatedly poured onto the streets in protest in 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1976, prompted by economic shortages, political re- pression, and rising prices despite tight wage policies. In the most dramatic, and most sustained, opposition movement against com- munist rule, these grievances culminated in the founding of the independent trade union Solidarity, which claimed 10 million mem- bers, or over a third of the adult population, during 1980-81. In what was both a historical irony and evidence of the party's lax- ness, over 35 percent of the Polish Communist party's members joined Solidarity, while 45 percent expressed pro-Solidarity sen- timent in public opinion surveys.87 In response to the rise of Solidarity in 1980, hundreds of Pol- ish party organizations formed networks independent of the na- tional leadership (the "horizontal movements") and presented pro- grammatic proposals to the 9th Party Congress in July 1981. Delegates were largely chosen democratically by their basic or- ganizations, and a real exchange of views took place (as opposed to the standard scripted speeches, dutifully followed by "stormy applause"). The new Central Committee elected by the Congress consisted of a majority of new members, beholden to their con- stituent rank and file and not to party leaders.88 Only 21 of the previous 200 Central Committee members were re-elected. At the same time, over 50 percent of the first secretaries of the basic or- ganizations were changed, as were 38 percent at the factory, town, and commune levels.89 Although the horizontal movements were quelled as part of the pacification of society following the impo- sition of martial law in December 1981, they established the gen- eration of politicians active in democratic Polish politics today. Responding to these crises, the party exchanged party leaders (in 1956, 1970, and in 1981), as party publications openly blamed leaders for the party crises,90 and party congresses castigated those 87. David Mason, "The Polish Party in Crisis, 1980-1982," Slavic Review (Spring 1984): 30-45, 37. 88. Werner Hahn, Democracy in a Communist Party (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 128. 89. Paul Lewis, PoliticalAuthority and Party Secretaries in Poland 1975-1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 132. 90. Nowe Drogi 1/2 1981. East European Politics and Societies 443 held responsible.91 The PZPR further attempted to mend its ways and to "consult" with society through freer elections and refer- enda in the 1980s. Even if it never fully liberalized either the polity or the economy, it continued to foster its young elites, making them capable of both political and economic reforms. For its part, the Solidarity movement, though self-limiting, nev- ertheless exerted enormous pressure on the party-state to trans- form not only the economy but also the polity. Occurring as it did only a few years before the democratic transition, the Soli- darity era remained alive in the memories of both the party elites and the populace. As the conflict between the party and the so- ciety persisted, the decade culminated in the Round Table nego- tiations of 1989, the result of yet another wave of strikes in the fall of 1988. Faced with increasing social ferment, reform currents were reactivated by the party itself: the December 1988 10th Plenum specifically encouraged local organizations to aid the party by facilitating reform currents and platforms. As a result, many such groups arose locally, but with considerable elite ties. Throughout 1989, over 200 reformist platforms arose, garnering over 80 percent of the delegates at the founding congress of the successor party in January 1990.92 The Polish party thus had a plethora of options for both individual elite survival and success, and the adaptation of the party to democratic competition after 1989. Nonetheless, there were two main limitations to these efforts. First, the Polish party reformists had never clearly organized themselves prior to the transition. Second, unlike its Hungarian counterpart, the Polish opposition did nothing to support party reform efforts. The Polish party members repeatedly revolted against its leadership, but found no support from the anticom- munist opposition.93 As a result, although the party elites had the capability to transform the party into a successful democratic com- petitor after 1989, they had to contend with a persistent cleavage 91. Leszek Grzybowski, Milczenie Ideolog6w (Warszawa: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza), 1985. 92. Trybuna Ludu, 23 June 89; 1 December 89; interview with Slawomir Wiatr, 27 May 1997, Warsaw. 93. "Kappa," Partia Stanu Wojennego (Warsaw: Samizdat, 1984. Available at the National Library, Warsaw), 7. 444 Organizational Strategies of Communist Parties between the adherents of the former opposition and of the for- mer Communist party. Hungary The Hungarian Communist party (Magyar Komuniszta Part [MKP], subsequently the Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart [MSzMP]) also received little public support after the Second World War.94 It, too, was widely seen as a Soviet import, foreign to Hungarian politi- cal traditions.95 Like the KSC, the Hungarian party competed in free elections, but received only 16.9 percent of the vote to the win- ning Smallholders' party's 57 percent in the elections of 1945. The elections themselves were conducted under considerable shadows of doubt. Like their Polish and Hungarian counterparts, the Hun- garian communists became part of the ruling coalition chiefly due to the presence of the Soviet Army.96 No international supervi- sion was allowed, and only Soviet observers ensured the fairness of the elections. Furthermore, the Soviet military commander in Hungary at the time initially threatened to increase the army pres- ence from 600,000 to 3 million and to starve the country unless a favorable result emerged.97 Backed by Soviet intimidation, the party then resorted to an internecine war of attrition ("salami tac- tics") within the government coalition to increase its share of power and eliminate its coalition partners. Since its capture of power relied chiefly on Soviet intimidation, coalitional trickery, and elite deception, the party had little use for an extensive and mobilized membership or for its organization as a mainstay of power. There was only one party organization for every 417 Hungarians, a rate far lower than in the Czech lands, 94. The party changed its name to the Hungarian Workers' party (MDP) in June 1948, and then again in 1956 to the Hungarian Socialist Workers' party (MSzMP). 95. Miklos Molnar, From Bela Kun to Janos Kadar (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 129. The Hungarian Communist party had led the ill-fated and short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919, which unleashed an enormous backlash against communism. 96. As early as fall 1944, the Soviet delegation demanded that the party be in any and all postwar governing coalitions (Molnar, Bela Kun, 99). Elections themselves were held only because the Soviets insisted that Hungary fulfill this condition of international recognition (Bennett Kovrig, Communism in Hungary [Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Insti- tution Press, 1979], 176). 97. Kovrig, ibid., 179-80. East European Politics and Societies 445 or in Slovakia. In contrast to the 25.3 percent of Czech adults as party members, Hungarian party membership peaked at 12.3 per- cent of the adult population in 1948. Afterwards, the membership declined to an average of 6 percent of adult Hungarians, almost as low as in Poland but lower than in Bulgaria, with 9.7 percent adult participation.98 In contrast to the Czech obsession with ideological purity, the Hungarian party purged far fewer members, and displayed little concern with the members' ideological loyalty.99 The party spoke of the "dialectic impossibility" of reconciling its leading role with mass membership and limited itself to vague declarations.100 Hungarian party officials went out of their way to emphasize that expulsion from or being stricken from the membership lists car- ried no penalties,101 and the party leader himself, Jainos Ka'dair, em- phasized that the party brought large numbers of non-party ex- perts into both the state administration and the economic sphere. To maintain the stability of its rule, the party resorted to a cyclical liberalization of economic policies and cautious negotiation with society. To do so, the Hungarian party pursued "technical experts" rather than blue-collar workers. As one scholar summarized, "the MSzMP was indeed extremely successful in incorporating qualified technical experts, professionals, and bureaucrats into the party or- ganization. In contrast, strong ideological control, stringent cadre policies, and persistent anti-intellectual bias underlie the relatively weak effects of education in Czechoslovakia."'102 As a result, the party deliberately pursued the co-optation of the intelligentsia and administrative technocrats, especially in the 98. Holmes, Communist World, 147. 99. This is not to say that the Polish and Hungarian parties were simply hands-off man- agers without either influence or power. They were in full control of the government, the repressive apparatus, and the military (both of which were used to resolve do- mestic crises, such as the Rajk show trials in 1948-49 and the executions of 2,000 Hungarians after the 1956 uprising, the shooting of striking workers in 1970 and 1976 in Poland, and the institution of military law in Poland in 1980 all show). 100. Partelet, I. 1973. 101. All the communist parties under consideration made the somewhat Talmudic dis- tinction between being expelled and being struck from party lists: the latter often en- tailed fewer sanctions and allowed for (very slim, in the Czech case) the possibility of return to the party. 102. Wong, "Social Composition of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian Communist Par- ties in the 1980s," 77-8. 446 Organizational Strategies of Communist Parties 1970s and 1980s, offering them considerable sign-up incentives, as their know-how and experience made them valuable in for- mulating and implementing reform policies. As a result, the more educated the functionary, the higher his chances for advancement. After 1956, the MSzMP was uniquely intense in its recruitment of the intelligentsia;103 non-party members were offered grants and positions in higher administration. At the same time, to really ad- vance in the Ministry of Interior, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, or other important governmental departments, one had to join the party. Party positions were paid very well, and so many non-party technocrats, who spent the first decade or so of their careers in local administration, then made the horizontal move to the far more lucrative party structures. The move was facilitated by the lack of stigma attached to party membership and the minimal require- ments for party members. For example, Hungary after 1956 saw no recorded expulsions for ideological reasons.104 The result was that, despite occasional crackdowns, the party actually had an over- representation of intellectuals in its ranks, in stark contrast with the KSC's anti-intellectual bias-by 1989, over half the Hungar- ian party members were white-collar workers.105 In short, the party promoted the rise of non-ideological, expe- rienced professional administrators, who would prove key to its post-1989 development, and it did so on an unprecedented scale. The Polish party's recruitment focused more on skilled political operatives than on the administrative strata, while the Bulgarian party was late in beginning its recruitment of intellectuals and ad- ministrators, after years of alternating intelligentsia co-optation and subsequent repression.106 The "revolving door" personnel policies of the Hungarian party also meant that the cadres and mid-level elites acquired a variety of experiences in their advancement, and gained consid- erable flexibility and diversity in their abilities. Kad ar was noto- 103. Patrick O'Neil, "Revolution from Within: Institutional Analysis, Transitions from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary," World Politics (July 1996): 579-603. 104. Molnar, Bela Kun, 206. 105. T6kes, Negotiated Revolution, 109, 140-41. 106. Georgi Karasimeonov, "Bulgaria's New Party System" in Geoffrey Pridham and Paul G. Lewis, Stabilising Fragile Democracies: Comparing New Party Systems in South- ern and Eastern Europe (London: Routledge, 1996), 255. East European Politics and Societies 447 rious for constantly appointing and reappointing mid-level party leaders to different positions, following a policy of "lateral moves" designed to give his appointees broad-based experience (and to en- sure that his power remained consolidated).107 As a result, the top leadership's annual turnover rates averaged 25 percent in Hungary, less than in Poland, but significantly higher than in Czechoslo- vakia. Thus, while the top elites in the Politburo averaged 15 years in office,108 the mid-level cadres from whom the future elites would be drawn were constantly recirculated. The regime crisis, when it came in 1956, underscored the irrel- evance of the party organization and the need for further negoti- ation and reform as a way to build social stability. The 1956 pop- ular uprising was a massive protest against the communist regime, and was put down by the Soviet invasion. The party, unable to control the situation, collapsed from within and was dissolved and refounded.109 As in Poland, the party leadership was replaced (in Bulgaria, where no comparable regime crises occurred, leaders were also exchanged, while the members were ignored)."10 A recruit- ment drive followed, paying scant attention to party, but it was seen as secondary to rebuilding the security forces."' As the newly installed Hungarian leader, Kiadar first pursued a policy of extreme repression, and then advanced a "social contract" of sorts: the pro- vision of consumer goods and a limited political pluralism (whose boundaries expanded with time) were exchanged for societal ac- ceptance. The party sought to co-opt those who might move against it, both by giving the intelligentsia considerable incentives to join and by pursuing this social contract. Once the aftershocks subsided, the 1962 "alliance policy" an- nounced that "those who are not against us, are for us." Lower- ing the ideology bar, the policy also allowed more internal party pluralism. Party leaders insisted on the necessity of debate within local organizations."12 Party elections were now to be held by se- 107. Open Society Archives, Hungary File: Personnel Changes, 4 December 1980, MTI report. 108. T6k6s, Negotiated Revolution, 58. 109. See Kovrig, Communism in Hungary; and Molnar, Bela Kun. 110. Dellin, Communist Party of Bulgaria, 62. 111. Kovrig, Communism in Hungary, 319. 112. Partelet, June 1982. 448 Organizational Strategies of Communist Parties cret ballot, the party committees were enjoined to apply resolu- tions to the local conditions, and "communists in nonparty state and social organizations were instructed to resort to persuasion to implement the party line."113 By 1983, competitive elections were held within the party for county-level party secretaries, and in the Academy of Sciences, trade unions, and cooperative farms, with the result that 20 percent of the officially sponsored candi- dates were not elected.'14 These reforms constituted the most liberal regime of the 1970s and 1980s among the cases studied. The Czech party refused to re- form or negotiate, and its dominance precluded any Slovak efforts. In Bulgaria and in East Germany, reforms, such as the 1979 imita- tion of New Economic Mechanism (NEM), were pale reflections of the Hungarian liberalization. And in Poland, the cycles of re- form and repression, combined with a far deeper economic crisis and political dissatisfaction, could not establish liberalization. As a result of this engagement, by the mid-i 980s an openly re- formist wing formed within the Hungarian party leadership, finding considerable support both within and outside the party.115 Three separate layers of reformers arose: first, a grassroots reform movement within the party developed. Well-organized, but lack- ing formal access to power, they were nonetheless able to forge alliances with reformers in the party elite, who then acted as their political godfathers, by attending two national meetings of the re- form movement and speaking out in their favor. This reform wing within the party leadership itself coalesced by the fall of 1989, form- ing another layer of reformers in the party. Finally, the diffuse ad- ministrative intelligentsia had become increasingly politicized and turned to reforming the party in order to preserve their power. As a result, not only were reformers present at all levels, but they were directly in the seat of power. By 1987, party leaders agreed that so long as opposition or- ganizations such as the Hungarian Democratic Forum served, at least on paper, the interests of socialism, the government would 113. Kovrig, Communism in Hungary, 355. 114. Stephen White, "Economic Performance and Communist Legitimacy," World Poli- tics 38:3 (April 1986): 462-82, 473. 115. Pataki, Judith. "Hungary," Radio Free Europe Situation Report, 24 May 1989. East European Politics and Societies 449 leave them alone. Several lower-level elite members supported these dissident groups, and even attended their meetings, forming nu- merous personal ties with opposition leaders. Thus, the liberals in the Hungarian communist successor party could run as reformist "alternatives" by the first free elections in 1990. Although the cen- ter did not encourage reform platforms as actively as the Polish party, seven platforms were presented at the founding congress of the successor party in October 1989, each with its own set of pol- icy proposals. The Reformist Alliance, the largest of the lot, claimed a third of the delegates. As a result, at the forefront of the reformers during the demo- cratic transition were Mikl6s Nemeth, Imre Pozsgay, and Rezso Nyers (the prime minister and ministers of the state)-all experi- enced administrators. The first leader of the Hungarian party, Gyula Horn, was the foreign minister in the late 1980s. Of the 43 representatives of the MSzP in the first freely elected Hungarian parliament, five were former ministers, and three were former state secretaries. Given their administrative reform experience, these new elites were well-positioned to transform the MSzMP and re-enter democratic politics after 1989. Organizational Strategies and their Effects The communist parties in East Central Europe persisted in im- plementing organizational practices that followed indirectly from their capture of power. Parties that perceived powerful domestic or external opponents saturated society with party organizations and asserted direct control over individual action and association. These parties were also reluctant to engage in any reform, since such changes would call into question the legitimacy of the regime. Thus, the Czech communist party, with the highest lev- els of initial political legitimacy, repressed its society far more than its counterparts. The trauma of the postwar elections led the party to value stability above all. Similarly, the East German SED, whose existence was intimately tied to the East German state and its initially precarious position, feared destabilization above all. The KSC and the SED both counted on their party membership to maintain control, and were suspicious of any pluralist overtures. 450 Organizational Strategies of Communist Parties They thus emphasized membership size and purity, denounced re- formist efforts, and clamped down on the members after political crises. Having gained legitimacy once, the Czech leadership saw no need to negotiate with society or otherwise demonstrate re- sponsiveness. The more pragmatic SED leaders nevertheless re- fused to endanger the East German fortress with sustained reforms, instead relying on a combination of saturation with party organ- izations, repression, surveillance by the secret police (Stasi), and minimal reforms. In contrast, the parties who rode into power on Soviet tanks and had little legitimacy in their own right were more likely to allow some degree of economic and political reform. For the Pol- ish and Hungarian parties, their initial lack of support led them to redouble efforts to gain acceptance through constant efforts to demonstrate responsiveness. They thus neither made extensive in- roads into society, nor did they have much use for party mem- bership. Instead, they focused on leadership change and policy ad- justment. Since there was no initial mass legitimization, these parties constantly bargained with society in an attempt to keep social peace. Similarly, the Bulgarian party, despite the hardline leadership of Zhivkov, also devolved into co-opting the intelli- gentsia and instituting cycles of minor reforms. These organizational strategies were replicated by deliberate action. Party politicians used party history both in its symbolic dimensions and as a template for further action. Older party lead- ers advocated the rise of those they had promoted earlier. Finally, past developments were used to justify actions to party members to others. Given their considerable stake in the persistence of specific organizational strategies, political actors actively sought to replicate their favored strategies. Once these strategies became formalized, alternatives became more difficult to envision.116 As a result, the influence of earlier organizational strategies 116. See Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics" American Political Science Review (June 2000): 24-67. Brian Arthur, Increasing Re- turns and Path Dependence in Economy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and EconomicPerformance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Compara- tive Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). East European Politics and Societies 451 lasted throughout, and well beyond, the communist era. Conse- quently, the parties found themselves in very different straits by the late 1980s. The parties' permeation of society to maintain their authority had two consequences. First, the more a party saw its own organization as a mainstay of power, the less incentive and capability it had to attempt to reform the economy or the polity. Once legitimated, such parties saw little need for further response to societal demands. Negotiations or reform were more likely to be seen as destabilizing concessions. As a result, the transition to democracy was more likely to result from regime collapse, rather than from negotiations with the opposition. Second, the more the party had saturated society with its struc- tures and demanded ideological conformity, the greater its difficul- ties in adapting to democratic competition after 1989. Such com- petition demanded responsive party programs, appeals to broad constituencies, and attractive elite candidates, which these com- munist parties were ill-prepared to provide. As a result, both the Czech and East German communist successor parties have ap- pealed chiefly as protest parties, representing those dissatisfied with the post-1989 transformations in their respective countries. The communist personnel policies of elite recruitment and ad- vancement also had twin implications for the parties. First, under communism, the more politically and administratively skilled the elites, the more likely they were to engage the opposition and re- spond with political and economic reform. Elites without these skills could neither envision nor implement even the most tenta- tive of reforms, as evidenced by the stagnation present in the Czech policies prior to and after 1968. Second, after 1989, the more pluralist and pragmatic the elite, the more likely they were to implement radical change within the party and successfully adapt to democracy. Such elites all had con- siderable recent experiences in administration and politicking that were readily portable to the new institutional setting after 1989. Given the convertibility of their skills, they succeeded outside of the party, either in the economic sphere through "nomen- klatura privatization" or in the political sphere by transforming the communist successor parties into successful democratic com- petitors. The more the party recruited from the outside, recir- 452 Organizational Strategies of Communist Parties culated its elites, and allowed a measure of internal party plural- ism, the greater the chances that pragmatic, experienced admin- istrators could arise in the party. Such elites were most likely to transform the parties in 1989 and adapt successfully to democratic competition. East European Politics and Societies 453 * I would like to thank Gary Bass, John Connelly, Timothy Dowling, and Vladimir Tismaneanu for helpful comments. An earlier draft was presented at the “New Directions in the Study of East European State Socialism” workshop at Harvard University, 7-9 November 1997. 1. The prewar patterns of bourgeois and socialist strength resulted in the postwar regime types, according to Herbert Kitschelt et al., Post-Communist Party Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 2. Kitschelt et al., ibid., chap. 1. 3. These are precisely documented in Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 4. Leslie Holmes, Politics in the Communist World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); and Stephen White, John Gardener, and George Schopflin, Communist Political Systems (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982). 5. Jan Gross, “The Social Consequences of War: Preliminaries to the Study of Imposition of Communist Regimes in East Central Europe,” East European Politics and Societies 3:2 (Spring 1989): 198-214. 6. Richard Staar, Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1988), 108. 7. I am indebted to John Connelly for this point. 8. Kenneth Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967), 46ff. Mattei Dogan, Pathways to Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), 3. For the argument that greater turnover leads to quicker and more responsive reaction to change, see also Robert Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), 147, and 67. 9. See Grzegorz Ekiert, The State Against Society (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). 10. The KSČ received considerably less in Slovakia. Its high Czech support has been explained as a function of the banning of the Agrarian party, the pro-Russian sentiment following liberation, and the gains in areas where Germans had been expelled following the war (Zdenek Suda Zealots and Rebels: A History of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980], 196ff). 11. SÚA Fond 01, sv 2 aj 12 2. Diskuse k referatu S. Gottwalda. 30.5.1946. Souček and Švermová. 12. Staar, Communist Regimes, 97. 13. At the time of its take over in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, the KSČ numbered 2.5 million members, or over 25.3 percent of the Czech population and 9.1 percent of the Slovak. Afterwards, anywhere from 13 to 16 percent of Czechs were in the party (prior to the debilitating Prague Spring purge), as were 6-7 percent of the Slovaks. 14. Karel Kaplan, Útvářeni generalní linie výstavby socialismu v Československu; od února do IX sjezdu KSČ (Praha: Academia, 1966), 166. Thus, 400 Czech villages had no party organizations in 1949. At the time, there were 11,695 such communities in the Czech Lands, and 3,361 in Slovakia. 15. SA ÚV KSS Sekretariat. 1954/Inf a./54-7.9 Karton č. 91. 16. Život Strany, 15, 1976, 12. 17. Holmes, Communist World, 142. 18. Staar, Communist Regimes, 108. 19. The 1980 party guidelines issued by the Central Committee of the KSČ called for 70 percent workers, 20 percent technical and intellectual workers, and 10 percent of agricultural workers in the party. 20. L. A. Dellin, “The Communist Party of Bulgaria,” in Stephen Fischer-Galati, ed., The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 60. 21. Gordon Wightman and Archie Brown, “Changes in the Level of Membership and Social Composition of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 1945-73,” Soviet Studies (July 1975): 396-417, esp. 409-410. Wightman argues that the drive to get more workers in the 1970s was an attempt to further control industrial sectors more effectively. 22. Raymond Sin-Kwok Wong, “The Social Composition of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian Communist Parties in the 1980s,” Social Forces (September 1996): 61-90, 78. 23. SA Fond ÚV KSS Predsednictvo 1981/1541/81-3.2 Karton č. 1596. As late as 1981, the Czechoslovak Communist Party still spoke of “characteristic care for the upholding of party rules, ensuring the discipline of the communist and purity of party ranks.” 24. Karel Kaplan, Political Persecution in Czechoslovakia . Research project “Crises in Soviet-Type Systems,” no. 3 (Köln: Index, 1983). 25. Kaplan, ibid., 13. 26. Milan Šimečka, The Restoration of Order: The Normalization of Czechoslovakia 1969-1976 . (London: Verso, 1984), 65. 27. Hans Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia since 1945 (London: Routledge, 1989), 110. 28. Gustav Husák, Život Strany, 11 December 1970. 29. Život Strany, 5/1976. 30. Život Strany, 14/1971. 31. Otto Ulč, Politics in Czechoslovakia . (San Francisco, Cal.: W. H. Freeman and Co, 1974), 105. 32. Kaplan, Political Persecution, 6. 33. Renner, History of Czechoslovakia, 111; Polityka, 2 September 1989. More conservative figures (Kaplan) place the number of Czechoslovak nomenklatura posts at 180-250 thousand. 34. The Hungarian system differed in that while the direct nomenklatura ranged from 10,000 in the mid-1980s to 90,000, the party held discretionary “advisory” rights to an additional 350,000 posts. 35. For example, over 1 million Hungarians had travelled abroad in 1970, and over 5 million did so in 1980. Over 870,000 Poles travelled abroad in 1970, and nearly 7 million did in 1980. In contrast, the figures for Czechoslovakia are 400,000 and 870,000, respectively. 36. Staar, Communist Regimes, 110 and 180. 37. SA Fond ÚV KSS Predsednictvo. 1970/1179/70-8.2/Karton č. 1274. 38. Party leaders admitted that 6 years after the announcement of collectivization in 1949, 6 percent of farms and 10 percent of land was collectivized. Faced with such levels of success, the party abandoned the policy in 1956. IV Plenum KC PZPR, 15-16.7.1955, quoted by Władysław Ważniewski, Walka polityczna w kierownictwie PPR i PZPR 1944-64 . (Toruń; Adam Marszałek, 1991), 53. 39. Sharon Wolchik, “Economic Performance and Political Change in Czechoslovakia,” in Charles Bukowski and Mark Cichock, eds., Prospects for Change in Socialist Systems (New York: Praeger, 1987), 48. 40. Karel Kaplan, Aparat UV KSC v letech 1948-68 . Prague: Sešity Ústavu Pro Soudobé Dějiny, Sv. 10, 1993, 13. 41. Its head, Vasil Mohorita, became the successor party's first leader and concluded the party's regeneration efforts in mid-1990 by arguing that since he had removed Marxist books and symbols from the party offices, the party had reformed. 42. Thomas Baylis, “Eastern Germany,” in Zoltan Barany and Ivan Volgyes, eds., The Legacies of Communism in Eastern Europe (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1995), 123. 43. Manfred Grote, “The Socialist Unity Party of Germany,” in Fischer-Galati, Communist Parties, 188-89. 44. Josef Blahoz, “Political Parties in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics: First Steps Toward the Rebirth of Democracy,” in Kay Lawson, ed., How Political Parties Work: Perspectives from Within (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), 230. 45. See H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976); Hans Renner, Dějiny Československa po roku 1945 (Bratislava: SAP, 1993); Vladimir V. Kusin, The Czechoslovak Reform Movement, 1968 (Santa Barbara, Cal.: ABC-Clio, 1973); id. Political Grouping in the Czechoslovak Reform Movement (New York, Columbia University Press, 1972); id., The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring: The Development of Reformist Ideas in Czechoslovakia, 1956-1967 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971). 46. Barbara Wolfe Jancar, Czechoslovakia and the Absolute Monopoly of Power (New York: Praeger, 1971), 125. 47. Wightman and Brown, “Changes in the Level of Membership,” 208. 48. Wolfe, Czechoslovakia and the Absolute Monopoly of Power 125. 49. Interview with Andre Brie, 7 July 1998, Berlin, PDS Headquarters. 50. Interview in February 1989 Partelet, quoted in Rudolf Tökés, Hungary's Negotiated Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 316. 51. For more on the groups and their fates after 1989, see Anna Grzymała-Busse, “Reform Efforts in the Czech and Slovak Communist Parties and their Successors, 1988-1993,” East European Politics and Societies (Fall 1998): 442-71. 52. The Slovak communists played a considerable role in the Slovak National Uprising, directed against the Hitlerite puppet government of wartime Slovakia, led by Monsignor Jozef Tiso. The considerable gains they made were lost, however, when they actively participated in the “Prague agreements,” which ceded Slovak autonomy to Prague and then made the Slovak Communist party a part of the Prague-centered Czechoslovak Communist party. 53. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1966), 50. 54. Politologický Kabinet SAV. Slovenska Spoločnost v krizoých rokoch 1967-1970 . Zbornik studii III. (Bratislava: SAV 1992), 186. 55. An exception is the Institute of Economic Planning, where the likes of Václav Klaus and Vladimír Dlouhý first became prominent. This same institute also employed Miloslav Ransdorf, currently the Czech successor's party main apologist. Unlike the Slovak Institute of Marxism-Leninism, however, the Institute of Economic Planning had no direct elite ties that would allow its members to ascend to the top of the successor party immediately. 56. Daniel Ziblatt, “Putting Humpty-Dumpty Together Again: Communism's Collapse and the Reconstruction of the East German Ex-Communist Party,” German Politics and Society (Spring 1998): 1-29. 57. Archiw Aktów Nowych, the Polish National Archive, Archive of New Records. (AAN), 295/II-2/KC 20-26. 5. 1945. See also Aleksander Kochański, ed., Protokoły posiedzeń Biura Politycznego KC PPR 1944-45 (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 1992), 81ff. 58. AAN 295/IV-2 K1-123 PPR KC. CKKP: protokoły i sprawozdania 1946-8. In immediate postwar Poland, “fascist” was the term used by communists to describe all independent political actors, including the second World War resistance groups, the London government in exile, and members of political parties. 59. AAN 295/VII-213 KC PPR. 19.7.1947. 60. Andrzej Palczak, Procesy Stalinizacji w Polsce w latach 1947-56 . (Zabrze: Wydawnictwo APEX, 1996), 33. AAN 295/IV-1 PPR KC. Early in the postwar era, the chair of the Central Party Revision Commission noted that they were especially embittered by the influx of religious Roman Catholics into the party. In another instance, party secretaries were reported to have started a collection campaign for a church monstrance among the workers entrusted to their care—and collected a staggering sum (295/IV-2: 20.2.1946 meeting of KC PPR KKKP). 61. AAN 295/I/20. 62. AAN 295/I/20. 63. Władysław Gomułka, in AAN 295/II-1. 6-7.7.1945. KC Plenum. A few days later, Gomułka acknowledged that a real mass party, if it could be achieved, would be “useful” in elections (AAN 295/II-3/11 12.7.1945). 64. Edward Babiuch, quoted in Grażyna Pomian, ed., Protokoł tzw. Komisji Grabskiego (Miedzyzakładowa Struktura “Solidarności,” 1987), 28. 65. Nowe Drogi, 1987. The Peasants' party was to be the chief representative of the countryside and its interests. 66. Due to the dominance of the Czech party center over its supposed partner in the Czechoslovak federation, the Slovak aparat was a relatively smaller fraction of the total. Despite the 3:2 parity that was to reflect the population differences, the Slovak aparat size was often a fourth of the Czech. 67. Kochański, ed., Protokoly posiedzeń, 26. 68. AAN AZHP 295/III, 23.11.1948, and AAN 295/II-3 11-12.VII.1945 Plenum KC. 69. AAN AZHP 295/III, 23.11.1948, and AAN 195/II-3 11-12.VII.1945 Plenum KC. ( Trybuna Ludu, 8 July 1966.) 70. AAN 237/VII-2337, Wydział Organizacyjny-Komitet Warszawski, 19.1.1953 report. 71. Trybuna Ludu, 8 July 1966. 72. Jacek Wasilewski, “The Patterns of Bureaucratic Elite Recruitment in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s,” Soviet Studies 4 (1990): 743-57, 747. 73. Nowe Drogi 1 (1981). 74. This is not to say that the Polish party had ignored internal dissent. In 1981, General Jaruzelski purged both the orthodox and the reformist “wings” in the party. Moreover, the PZPR had earlier made employment and schooling dependent on party loyalties—in 1945, Polish Politburo member Roman Zambrowski argued that no one could get a job without party membership (AAN 295/IV-1). However, he went on to argue that this policy backfired—the people became increasingly resentful, and the party gained no political benefit.) 75. Dellin, “Communist Party of Bulgaria,” 59. 76. SÚA Fond 02/4 sv. 15 aj. 20 bod 1.29.11.1971. This includes many members who were pressured to “resign.” Most of these were blue-collar workers, who had little to fear from party resignations. 77. Antoni Sułek, “The Polish United Worker's Party: From Mobilization to Non-Representation.” Soviet Studies (July 1990): 499-611, 503. 78. Mobilization itself creates further network ties, which then facilitate further mobilization. (Roger Gould, “Multiple Networks and Mobilization in the Paris Commune, 1871,” American Sociological Review [December 1991]: 716-29). 79. Rzeczpospolita, 13-14 April 1996, 3. The youth organization members, for example, learned trade laws long before anyone else had, giving them a considerable advantage when the market was liberalized in 1990. 80. Ewa Wilk, “Ordynacka rządzi Polską,” Polityka (23 December 1995); 20-26. At the same time, the pre-1989 opposition may have received very different “training.” Karol Modzelewski argues that the conspiratorial conditions under which the opposition worked in Poland and in the Czech Republic meant that “taking great personal risks, they develop a special type of loyalty. Conspiracy unites those who struggle together, rather than with sympathizers who, although passive, nevertheless make up the movement's social base. That is how a community of veterans is born. If it takes over power, it can easily result in a `Republic of Buddies.' Although Tadeusz Mazowiecki did not engage in this demoralizing practice, it was already evident that the most important reference point for Solidarity's leaders was its own political elite rather than their social base among workers” (Karol Modzelewski, “Where did Solidarity Go?” Uncaptive Minds [Winter-Spring 1994]: 63-72, 69). 81. Paul Lewis, Political Authority and Party Secretaries in Poland 1975-1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 294. 82. Jacek Wasilewski, “The Patterns of Bureaucratic Elite Recruitment in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s,” Soviet Studies 42 (1990): 749-50. 83. Jacek Wasilewski, ed., Konsolidacja Elit politycznych w Polsce 1991-1993 (Warsaw: PAN ISP, 1994). 84. The notable exception was Leszek Miller, an ostensible representative of the conservatives within the party. 85. Trybuna Ludu, 27 April 1981. 86. These include such SdRP (Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland) and post-1989 government notables as: Aleksander Kwasniewski, Jozef Oleksy, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Grzegorz Kołodko, Dariusz Rosati, Marek Borowski, Ryszard Czarny, Marek Siwiec, Jerzy Koźminski, Jerzy Szmajdziński, Bogusław Liberadzki, Jerzy Kropiwnicki, Stefan Olszowski, Hieronim Kubiak, and Manfred Gorywoda. A related source of party cadres was the Central School of Planning and Statistics (Szkoła Główna Planowania I Statystyki [SGPiS]), which produced such future government leaders as Leszek Balcerowicz, Dariusz Rosati, Grzegorz Kołodko, and Andrzej Olechowski. The SZSP youth organization was especially powerful at the SGPiS. 87. David Mason, “The Polish Party in Crisis, 1980-1982,” Slavic Review (Spring 1984): 30-45, 37. 88. Werner Hahn, Democracy in a Communist Party (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 128. 89. Paul Lewis, Political Authority and Party Secretaries in Poland 1975-1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 132. 90. Nowe Drogi 1/2 1981. 91. Leszek Grzybowski, Milczenie Ideologów (Warszawa: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza), 1985. 92. Trybuna Ludu, 23 June 89; 1 December 89; interview with Slawomir Wiatr, 27 May 1997, Warsaw. 93. “Kappa,” Partia Stanu Wojennego (Warsaw: Samizdat, 1984. Available at the National Library, Warsaw), 7. 94. The party changed its name to the Hungarian Workers' party (MDP) in June 1948, and then again in 1956 to the Hungarian Socialist Workers' party (MSzMP). 95. Miklos Molnar, From Bela Kun to Janos Kadar (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 129. The Hungarian Communist party had led the ill-fated and short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919, which unleashed an enormous backlash against communism. 96. As early as fall 1944, the Soviet delegation demanded that the party be in any and all postwar governing coalitions (Molnar, Bela Kun, 99). Elections themselves were held only because the Soviets insisted that Hungary fulfill this condition of international recognition (Bennett Kovrig, Communism in Hungary [Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979], 176). 97. Kovrig, ibid., 179-80. 98. Holmes, Communist World, 147. 99. This is not to say that the Polish and Hungarian parties were simply hands-off managers without either influence or power. They were in full control of the government, the repressive apparatus, and the military (both of which were used to resolve domestic crises, such as the Rajk show trials in 1948-49 and the executions of 2,000 Hungarians after the 1956 uprising, the shooting of striking workers in 1970 and 1976 in Poland, and the institution of military law in Poland in 1980 all show). 100. Partelet, I. 1973. 101. All the communist parties under consideration made the somewhat Talmudic distinction between being expelled and being struck from party lists: the latter often entailed fewer sanctions and allowed for (very slim, in the Czech case) the possibility of return to the party. 102. Wong, “Social Composition of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian Communist Parties in the 1980s,” 77-8. 103. Patrick O'Neil, “Revolution from Within: Institutional Analysis, Transitions from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary,” World Politics (July 1996): 579-603. 104. Molnar, Bela Kun, 206. 105. Tökés, Negotiated Revolution, 109, 140-41. 106. Georgi Karasimeonov, “Bulgaria's New Party System” in Geoffrey Pridham and Paul G. Lewis, Stabilising Fragile Democracies: Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe (London: Routledge, 1996), 255. 107. Open Society Archives, Hungary File: Personnel Changes, 4 December 1980, MTI report. 108. Tökés, Negotiated Revolution, 58. 109. See Kovrig, Communism in Hungary; and Molnar, Bela Kun . 110. Dellin, Communist Party of Bulgaria, 62. 111. Kovrig, Communism in Hungary, 319. 112. Partelet, June 1982. 113. Kovrig, Communism in Hungary, 355. 114. Stephen White, “Economic Performance and Communist Legitimacy,” World Politics 38:3 (April 1986): 462-82, 473. 115. Pataki, Judith. “Hungary,” Radio Free Europe Situation Report, 24 May 1989. 116. See Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics” American Political Science Review (June 2000): 24-67. Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in Economy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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