A probabilistic approach to quantum Bayesian games of incomplete information

Azhar Iqbal; JM Chappell; Q Li; CEM Pearce; D Abbott

A probabilistic approach to quantum Bayesian games of incomplete information

Azhar Iqbal
, JM Chappell
, Q Li
, CEM Pearce
, D Abbott

King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

23 Scopus citations

Abstract

A Bayesian game is a game of incomplete information in which the rules of the game are not fully known to all players. We consider the Bayesian game of Battle of Sexes that has several Bayesian Nash equilibria and investigate its outcome when the underlying probability set is obtained from generalized Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiments. We find that this probability set, which may become non-factorizable, results in a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game.

Original language	English
Journal	Quantum Information Processing
State	Published - 2014

Cite this

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title = "A probabilistic approach to quantum Bayesian games of incomplete information",

abstract = "A Bayesian game is a game of incomplete information in which the rules of the game are not fully known to all players. We consider the Bayesian game of Battle of Sexes that has several Bayesian Nash equilibria and investigate its outcome when the underlying probability set is obtained from generalized Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiments. We find that this probability set, which may become non-factorizable, results in a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game.",

author = "Azhar Iqbal and JM Chappell and Q Li and CEM Pearce and D Abbott",

year = "2014",

language = "English",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - A probabilistic approach to quantum Bayesian games of incomplete information

AU - Iqbal, Azhar

AU - Chappell, JM

AU - Li, Q

AU - Pearce, CEM

AU - Abbott, D

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - A Bayesian game is a game of incomplete information in which the rules of the game are not fully known to all players. We consider the Bayesian game of Battle of Sexes that has several Bayesian Nash equilibria and investigate its outcome when the underlying probability set is obtained from generalized Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiments. We find that this probability set, which may become non-factorizable, results in a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game.

AB - A Bayesian game is a game of incomplete information in which the rules of the game are not fully known to all players. We consider the Bayesian game of Battle of Sexes that has several Bayesian Nash equilibria and investigate its outcome when the underlying probability set is obtained from generalized Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiments. We find that this probability set, which may become non-factorizable, results in a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game.

M3 - Article

SN - 1570-0755

JO - Quantum Information Processing

JF - Quantum Information Processing

ER -

A probabilistic approach to quantum Bayesian games of incomplete information

Abstract

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